Causality-based Verification of Multi-threaded Programs joint work with Bernd Finkbeiner

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Introduction		
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Our approach

• Proof objects: concurrent traces

allow to capture temporal order, constraints, independence



Introduction		
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Our approach

• Proof objects: concurrent traces allow to capture temporal order, constraints, independence

• Proof rules based on causality causality \equiv language-preserving trace transformations



Introduction		
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Our approach

• Proof objects: concurrent traces allow to capture temporal order, constraints, independence

• Proof rules based on causality causality \equiv language-preserving trace transformations

• Proof construction: tableau search based on causal loops causal loops \equiv infinitely-looping trace transformations



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Safety/Reachability		LTL Model Checking
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Threa	d 1	Thread	2	Threa	d 3
<pre>while</pre>	<pre>(true) { noncritical; request r; critical; release r;</pre>	while $m_1:$ $m_2:$ $m_3:$ $m_4:$ }	<pre>(true) { noncritical; request r; critical; release r;</pre>	<pre>while n1: n2: n3: n4: }</pre>	<pre>(true) { noncritical; request r; critical; release r;</pre>

Safety/Reachability		LTL Model Checking
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Thread 1	Thread 2	Thread 3
while (true) {	while (true) {	while (true) $\{$
I ₁ : noncritical;	m1: noncritical;	n1: noncritical;
I ₂ : request r;	m ₂ : request r;	n ₂ : request r;
I ₃ : critical;	m ₃ : critical;	n ₃ : critical;
<pre>/4: release r;</pre>	<pre>m4: release r;</pre>	<pre>n₄: release r;</pre>
}	}	}

Definition (Most general semaphore class)

Simple semaphore class +

- arbitrary control flow
- arbitrary number of semaphore variables

Safety/Reachability		
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Threa	d 1	Thread	2	Thread	13
while	(true) {	while	(true) {	while	(true) {
$I_1:$	noncritical;	m_1 :	noncritical;	n_1 :	noncritical;
$I_2:$	request r;	m_2 :	request r;	<i>n</i> ₂ :	request r;
<i>I</i> ₃ :	critical;	<i>m</i> ₃ :	critical;	<i>n</i> ₃ :	critical;
<i>I</i> ₄ :	release r;	$m_4:$	release r;	n4:	release r;
}		}		}	

Definition (Most general semaphore class)

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Open problem

Is the most general semaphore class polynomially verifiable for a fixed number of locks?

Safety/Reachability		LTL Model Checking
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Threa	d 1	Thread	2	Thread	13
while	(true) {	while	(true) {	while	(true) {
$I_1:$	noncritical;	m_1 :	noncritical;	n_1 :	noncritical;
$I_2:$	request r;	m_2 :	request r;	<i>n</i> ₂ :	request r;
<i>I</i> ₃ :	critical;	<i>m</i> ₃ :	critical;	<i>n</i> ₃ :	critical;
<i>I</i> ₄ :	release r;	$m_4:$	release r;	n4:	release r;
}		}		}	

Definition (Most general semaphore class)

Simple semaphore class +

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- · arbitrary number of semaphore variables

Open problem

Is the most general semaphore class polynomially verifiable for a fixed number of locks?

Our causality-based reachability analysis algorithm has settled this question affirmatively.

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Safety/Reachability		LTL Model Checking
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Thread 1	Thread 2	Thread 3
<pre>while (true) { h1: noncritical; h2: request r; h3: critical; l4: release r; }</pre>	<pre>while (true) { m1: noncritical; m2: request r; m3: critical; m4: release r; }</pre>	<pre>while (true) { n1: noncritical; n2: request r; n3: critical; n4: release r; }</pre>

Safety/Reachability		LTL Model Checking
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Thread	11
while	(true) {
$I_1:$	noncritical;
I_2 :	request r;
<i>I</i> ₃ :	critical;
<i>I</i> ₄ :	release r;
}	

Thursd 1

while (true) {
 m1: noncritical;
 m2: request r;
 m3: critical;
 m4: release r;

Thread 2

Thread 3

while	(true) {
n_1 :	noncritical;
n_2 :	request r;
<i>n</i> ₃ :	critical;
$n_4:$	release r;
}	

$T_1 \text{ at } l_3 \land$	
T ₂ at m ₃	

Safety/Reachability		LTL Model Checking
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Thread 1					
while	(true) {				
$I_1:$	noncritical;				
$I_2:$	request r;				
<i>I</i> ₃ :	critical;				
<i>I</i> ₄ :	release r;				
}					

Thread 2 while (true) { m1: noncritical; m₂: request r; m₃: critical; m4: release r;

Thread 3

while	(true) {
n_1 :	noncritical;
n_2 :	request r;
<i>n</i> ₃ :	critical;
$n_4:$	release r;
}	

	[T ₁	at	b ∧	Ŋ
Init	\longrightarrow	T ₂	at	<i>m</i> ₃	IJ

What is necessary?

Safety/Reachability		LTL Model Checking
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Safety/Reachability		
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Transition system $S = \langle V, I, T \rangle$

- V: variables
- $I \in \Phi(V')$: initialization
- $T \subseteq \Phi(V \cup V')$: transitions

Safety/Reachability		
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Safety/Reachability		
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Safety/Reachability		
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Finite trace $\mathcal{A} = \langle N, E, \nu, \eta \rangle$

- $\langle N, E \rangle$ is a DAG
- $\nu: N \to \Phi(V \cup V')$
- $\eta: E \to \Phi(V \cup V')$

•
$$I \equiv x = 0 \land y = 0$$

• $T \equiv \{ x^+: x' = x + 1 \land y' = y \\ x^-: x' = x - 1 \land y' = y \\ y^+: y' = y + 1 \land x' = x \\ y^-: y' = y - 1 \land x' = x \}$
• $F \equiv x = 1 \land y = 1$

Safety/Reachability		
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• $F = x = 1 \land y = 1$

Language of a finite concurrent trace

A set of system runs such that a *linearization* of a concurrent trace can be mapped into a *subsequence* of a run, *respecting constraints*

Safety/Reachability		
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• $F \equiv x = 1 \land y = 1$

Language of a finite concurrent trace

A set of system runs such that a *linearization* of a concurrent trace can be mapped into a *subsequence* of a run, *respecting constraints*

Safety/Reachability		
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$$x = 0$$

$$y = 0$$

$$x = 1$$

$$y = 1$$

Accepted runs

- *I*, *x*⁺, *y*⁺, *F*
- I, y^+, x^+, F
- I, y^+, x^+, x^-, x^+, F
- ...

Rejected runs

- 1, **x**⁺, F
- *I*, *x*⁺, *y*⁺, *x*⁺, *F*
- $I, \mathbf{x}^-, \mathbf{y}^-, F$
- ...

Safety/Reachability		
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$$x = 0$$

$$y = 0$$

$$x = 1$$

$$y = 1$$

Accepted runs

- *I*, *x*⁺, *y*⁺, *F*
- I, y^+, x^+, F
- I, y^+, x^+, x^-, x^+, F
- ...

Rejected runs

- 1, **x**⁺, F
- *I*, *x*⁺, *y*⁺, *x*⁺, *F*
- $I, \mathbf{x}^-, \mathbf{y}^-, F$
- ...

Safety/Reachability		
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Accepted runs

- *I*, **x**⁺, **y**⁺, *F*
- I, y^+, x^+, F
- I, y^+, x^+, x^-, x^+, F
- ...

Rejected runs

- 1, **x**⁺, F
- *I*, *x*⁺, *y*⁺, *x*⁺, *F*
- 1, **x**⁻, **y**⁻, F
- ...

Safety/Reachability		
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Accepted run $\begin{array}{c|cccc}
 & y^{+} & x^{+} & F \\
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Safety/Reachability		
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Finite concurrent traces



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Finite concurrent traces



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Finite concurrent traces





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Reachability analysis algorithm

[K., Finkbeiner, CONCUR 2013]



Safety/Reachability		
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Proof rules: finite traces

Event split



Order split



Safety/Reachability		
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Proof rules: finite traces





Safety/Reachability 000000●		

Safety

Theorem (Soundness)

If there exists a correct and complete causal trace tableau for a transition system S, then S is safe.

Theorem (Relative completeness)

If a transition system S is safe, then a correct and complete causal trace tableau for S can be constructed, provided that all necessary first-order formulas are given.

Theorem (Polynomiality for semaphore programs)

Causality-based verification algorithm proves the safety of the most general class of multi-threaded semaphore programs in deterministic polynomial time with respect to the number of threads and locks.

	Liveness/Termination	
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Termination of multi-threaded programs

• Parallel compilation (e.g. GNU Make)

gnu.org/software/make/

make -j N



• Parallel computations in GPUs (OpenCL, CUDA)

developer.nvidia.com/cuda-zone/



• Distributed processing (e.g. the Map-Reduce architecture)

developers.google.com/appengine/docs/java/dataprocessing/



• Device drivers, leader election, ...

	Liveness/Termination	LTL Model Checking
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Producer-Consumer (Map-Reduce architecture)

Producer 1	Producer 2	Consumer 1	Consumer 2
while (p1>0) {	while (p2>0) {	while (true) {	while (true) {
if(*) q1++;	if(*) q1++;	await(q1>0);	await(q2>0);
else q2++;	else q2++;	skip; //step 1	skip; //step 1
p1;	p2;	skip; //step 2	skip; //step 2
}	}	q1;	q2;
		}	}

	Liveness/Termination	LTL Model Checking
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Producer-Consumer (Map-Reduce architecture)

Producer 1	Producer 2	Consumer 1	Consumer 2
while (p1>0) {	while (p2>0) {	while (true) {	while (true) {
if(*) q1++;	if(*) q1++;	await(q1>0);	await(q2>0);
else q2++;	else q2++;	skip; //step 1	skip; //step 1
p1;	p2;	skip; //step 2	skip; //step 2
}	}	q1;	q2;
		}	}

	Terminator		T2		AProVE	
Threads	Time(s)	Mem.(MB)	Time(s)	Mem.(MB)	Time(s)	Mem.(MB)
1	3.37	26	2.42	38	3.17	237
2	1397	1394	3.25	44	6.79	523
3	×	MO	U(29.2)	253	U(26.6)	1439
4	×	MO	U(36.6)	316	U(71.2)	1455
5	×	MO	U(30.7)	400	U(312)	1536
10	×	MO	Z3-TO	×	×	MO
20	×	MO	Z3-TO	×	×	MO
40	×	MO	Z3-TO	×	×	MO
60	×	MO	Z3-TO	×	×	MO
80	×	MO	Z3-TO	×	×	MO
100	×	MO	Z3-TO	×	×	MO

	Liveness/Termination	LTL Model Checking
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Producer-Consumer (Map-Reduce architecture)

Producer 1	Producer 2	Consumer 1	Consumer 2
while (p1>0) {	while (p2>0) {	while (true) {	while (true) {
if(*) q1++;	if(*) q1++;	await(q1>0);	await(q2>0);
else q2++;	else q2++;	skip; //step 1	skip; //step 1
p1;	p2;	skip; //step 2	skip; //step 2
}	}	q1;	q2;
		}	}

	Teri	minator	T2		AProVE		Arctor ¹	
Threads	Time(s)	Mem.(MB)	Time(s)	Mem.(MB)	Time(s)	Mem.(MB)	Time(s)	Mem.(MB)
1	3.37	26	2.42	38	3.17	237	0.002	2.3
2	1397	1394	3.25	44	6.79	523	0.002	2.6
3	×	MO	U(29.2)	253	U(26.6)	1439	0.002	2.6
4	×	MO	U(36.6)	316	U(71.2)	1455	0.003	2.7
5	×	MO	U(30.7)	400	U(312)	1536	0.007	2.7
10	×	MO	Z3-TO	×	×	MO	0.027	3.0
20	×	MO	Z3-TO	×	×	MO	0.30	4.2
40	×	MO	Z3-TO	×	×	MO	4.30	12.7
60	×	MO	Z3-TO	×	×	MO	20.8	35
80	×	MO	Z3-TO	×	×	MO	67.7	145
100	×	MO	Z3-TO	×	×	MO	172	231

¹Arctor : Abstraction Refinement of Concurrent Temporal Orderings (react.uni-saarland.de/tools/arctor/)

Causality-based Verification of Multi-threaded Programs

	Liveness/Termination	
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Infinite concurrent traces



	Liveness/Termination	
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Infinite concurrent traces



	Liveness/Termination	
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Termination analysis algorithm

[K., Finkbeiner, CAV 2014]



	Liveness/Termination	LTL Model Checking
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Termination: soundness and completeness

Theorem (Soundness)

If there exists a correct and complete causal trace tableau for a transition system S, then S is terminating.

Theorem (Relative completeness)

If a transition system S is terminating, then a correct and complete causal trace tableau for S can be constructed, provided that all necessary first-order formulas are given.

	Liveness/Termination	
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Experimental results: simple programs

	Terr	minator		T2	AP	ProVE		Arctor	
Benchmark	Time(s)	Mem.(MB)	Time(s)	Mem.(MB)	Time(s)	Mem.(MB)	Time(s)	Mem.(MB)	Vertices
Chain 2	0.65	20	0.52	20	1.58	131	0.002	2.0	3
Chain 4	1.45	25	0.54	22	2.13	153	0.002	2.2	7
Chain 6	24.4	57	0.58	24	2.58	171	0.002	2.5	11
Chain 8	×	MO	0.63	26	3.48	210	0.002	2.5	15
Chain 20	×	MO	2.36	55	16.5	941	0.007	2.5	39
Chain 40	×	MO	40.5	288	536	1237	0.023	2.8	79
Chain 60	×	MO	Z3-TO	×	×	MO	0.063	3.0	119
Chain 80	×	MO	Z3-TO	×	×	MO	0.145	3.3	159
Chain 100	×	MO	Z3-T0	×	×	MO	0.320	3.9	199
Phase 1	×	MO	U(4.53)	48	1.60	132	0.002	2.4	2
Phase 2	×	MO	U(4.53)	48	2.16	144	0.002	2.4	11
Phase 3	×	MO	U(30.6)	301	3.83	199	0.002	2.5	20
Phase 4	×	MO	×	MO	8.89	336	0.003	2.6	29
Phase 8	×	MO	×	MO	47.0	1506	0.003	2.6	65
Phase 10	×	MO	×	MO	×	MO	0.012	2.7	83
Phase 20	×	MO	×	MO	×	MO	0.061	3.3	173
Phase 40	×	MO	×	MO	×	MO	0.35	4.0	353
Phase 60	×	MO	×	MO	×	MO	1.18	4.2	533
Phase 80	×	MO	×	MO	×	MO	3.21	5.1	713
Phase 100	×	MO	×	MO	×	MO	7.38	6.1	893
Semaphore 1	3.05	26	2.81	46	3.22	230	0.002	2.6	8
Semaphore 2	622	691	U(20.7)	219	U(6.52)	465	0.002	2.6	16
Semaphore 3	×	MO	U(15.8)	239	U(10.42)	1138	0.003	2.6	24
Semaphore 10	×	MO	U(83.5)	470	U(246)	1287	0.023	2.8	80
Semaphore 20	×	MO	×	MO	×	MO	0.073	3.3	160
Semaphore 40	×	MO	×	MO	×	MO	0.264	4.0	320
Semaphore 60	×	MO	×	MO	×	MO	0.58	4.0	480
Semaphore 80	×	MO	×	MO	×	MO	1.02	4.6	640
Semaphore 100	×	MO	×	MO	×	MO	1.59	5.1	800

	Liveness/Termination	LTL Model Checking
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Experimental results: models of industrial programs

• Parallel compilation (GNU Make)



• Parallel computations in GPUs (CUDA)



• Distributed processing (Map-Reduce)



No other termination prover can handle even 2 threads!

Threads	Time(s)	Mem.(MB)	Vertices
2	0.04	3.6	126
3	0.10	4.3	189
4	0.17	4.5	252
5	0.26	4.5	315
6	0.36	4.5	378
7	0.48	4.5	441
8	0.62	4.6	504
9	0.79	5.5	567
10	0.97	5.5	630

Threads	Time(s)	Mem.(MB)	Vertices
2	0.04	3.3	86
3	0.09	3.7	129
4	0.15	4.3	172
5	0.24	4.5	215
6	0.33	4.5	258
7	0.45	4.6	301
8	0.58	5.5	344
9	0.72	5.5	387
10	0.88	5.5	430

Threads	Time(s)	Mem.(MB)	Vertices
2	0.42	4.5	238
3	2.50	4.5	393
4	8.22	5.5	547
5	31.3	6.5	767
6	78.7	6.5	986
7	219	7.3	1271
8	457	8.3	1555
9	1053	9.3	1905
10	1924	11.4	2254

Arctor

	LTL Satisfiability/Validity	
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LTL Satisfiability/Validity

Applications

Specification debugging:

- detection of unsatisfiable specifications
- detection of vacuous specifications

Specification understanding:

• small models/countermodels

Can be used for finite-state LTL model checking by a simple reduction

Captures the LTL complexity

PSPACE-complete even for simple fragments L(F, X), L(U)

Decision algorithms

- Tableau calculus [Schwendimann, 1998]
- Clausal temporal resolution [Fischer, Dixon, Peim, 2001]
- Reduction to automata-based model checking [Rozier, Vardi, 2007]

	LTL Satisfiability/Validity	
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LTL concurrent traces



	LTL Satisfiability/Validity	
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LTL concurrent traces



	LTL Satisfiability/Validity	
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LTL concurrent traces



	LTL Satisfiability/Validity 00●0	

LTL proof rules



Finally

Globally

	LTL Satisfiability/Validity 00●0	

LTL proof rules



Next

Until

Safety/Reachability	LTL Satisfiability/Validity	LTL Model Checking
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	LTL Satisfiability/Validity	LTL Model Checking
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[Schwendimann, 1998,

	LTL Satisfiability/Validity	
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[Schwendimann, 1998,

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$(G F p \land G F \neg p) \dots \dots$	
$(GF p), GF \neg p \mid \ldots \mid \ldots$	
$F p, X G F p, (G F \neg p) \dots \dots$	
$(F p), X G F p, F \neg p, X G F \neg p \mid \ldots \mid \ldots$	
$p, X G F p, (F \neg p), X G F \neg p \{p\}; . $	Sub ₁
$p, \neg p, \ldots$ $p, X G F p, X F \neg p, X G F \neg p \mid \{p\}; . \ldots$	~
$(GFp), F\neg p, GF\neg p $	()
$F p, X G F p, F \neg p, (G F \neg p) \dots \dots$	
$\overline{(F p)}, X G F p, F \neg p, X G F \neg p \mid \ldots \mid \ldots$	
Sub ₂ $X F p, X G F p, (F \neg p), X G F \neg p \dots $.	
$X \vdash p, X \vdash p, \neg p, X \vdash p \neg p \mid \{\neg p\} ; . \mid$	Sub_3
$= F_{p, (GF_{p}), GF_{\neg p} \dots \dots} (X)$	
$F p, X G F p, (G F \neg p) \mid \ldots \mid \ldots$	
$(F p), X G F p, F \neg p, X G F \neg p \mid \ldots \mid \ldots$	
$p, X G F p, (F \neg p), X G F \neg p \{p\}; . Su$	ib ₄
$\overline{p, \neg p, \dots} \qquad p, X G F p, X F \neg p, X G F \neg p \mid \dots \mid (0, \emptyset) \pmod{O}$	

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$(G F p \land G F \neg p) \dots \dots$	
$(GF p), GF \neg p \mid \ldots \mid \ldots$	
$F_{p,X}GF_{p,(GF\neg p) \dots \dots}$	
$(F p), X G F p, F \neg p, X G F \neg p \mid \ldots \mid \ldots$	
$p, X G F p, (F \neg p), X G F \neg p \{p\}; . $	Sub ₁
$p, \neg p, \ldots$ $p, X G F p, X F \neg p, X G F \neg p \mid \{p\}; . \ldots$	
$(GFp), F \neg p, GF \neg p $.)
$F p, X G F p, F \neg p, (G F \neg p) \dots \dots$	
$\overline{(Fp)}, XGFp, F\neg p, XGF\neg p \mid \ldots \mid \ldots$	
Sub ₂ $X F p, X G F p, (F \neg p), X G F \neg p \dots $	-
$X F p, X G F p, \neg p, X G F \neg p \{\neg p\}; . $	Sub_3
$ = F_p, (GF_p), GF_{\neg p} \dots \dots $	
$\overline{F p, X G F p, (G F \neg p) \dots \dots}$	
$(F p), X G F p, F \neg p, X G F \neg p \dots \dots$	
$p, X G F p, (F \neg p), X G F \neg p \{p\}; . Su$	b_4
$\overline{p, \neg p, \dots} \qquad p, X G F p, X F \neg p, X G F \neg p \mid \dots \mid (0, \emptyset) \pmod{p}$	

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 $(p \wedge \neg p)^{\omega}$



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$(GF p \land GF \neg p) \mid \ldots \mid \ldots$		
$(G F p), G F \neg p \dots \dots$		
$F p, X G F p, (G F \neg p) \dots \dots$		
$(F p), X G F p, F \neg p, X G F \neg p \dots \dots$		
$p, X G F p, (F \neg p), X G F \neg p \{p\}; . $		Sub_1
$p, \neg p, \dots \qquad p, X G F p, X F \neg p, X G F \neg p \{p\} ; . \dots$	(24)	
$(GF p), F \neg p, GF \neg p \dots \dots$	(X)	
$F p, X G F p, F \neg p, (G F \neg p) \dots \dots$		
$(F p), X G F p, F \neg p, X G F \neg p \mid \ldots \mid \ldots$		
Sub ₂ $X F p, X G F p, (F \neg p), X G F \neg p \dots$		
$X F p, X G F p, \neg p, X G F \neg p \{\neg p\}; . \ldots$		Sub_3
$F_{p}, (GF_{p}), GF_{\neg p} \dots \dots$ (X)	
$\overline{Fp,XGFp,(GF\neg p)\mid\ldots\mid\ldots}$		
$(Fp), XGFp, F\neg p, XGF\neg p \dots \dots$		
$p, XGF p, (F\neg p), XGF\neg p \mid \{p\}; . $	Sub_4	
$\overline{p, \neg p, \dots} \qquad p, X G F p, X F \neg p, X G F \neg p \mid \dots \mid (0, \emptyset) \pmod{p}$		

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$(G F p \land G F \neg p) \mid \ldots \mid \ldots$	
$(GF p), GF \neg p \mid \ldots \mid \ldots$	
$F p, X G F p, (G F \neg p) \mid \ldots \mid \ldots$	
$(F p), X G F p, F \neg p, X G F \neg p \mid \ldots \mid \ldots$	
$p, X G F p, (F \neg p), X G F \neg p \{p\}; . $	Sub_1
$p, \neg p, \ldots$ $p, X G F p, X F \neg p, X G F \neg p \mid \{p\}; . \ldots$	
$(G F p), F \neg p, G F \neg p \dots \dots$ (X)	
$F p, X G F p, F \neg p, (G F \neg p) \dots \dots$	
$(F p), X G F p, F \neg p, X G F \neg p \mid \ldots \mid \ldots$	
Sub ₂ $X F p, X G F p, (F \neg p), X G F \neg p \dots \dots$	
$X F p, X G F p, \neg p, X G F \neg p \mid \{\neg p\}; . \mid \ldots$	Sub;
$F_p, (GF_p), GF \neg p \dots \dots$ (X)	
$F p, X G F p, (G F \neg p) \dots \dots$	
$(F p), X G F p, F \neg p, X G F \neg p \mid \ldots \mid \ldots$	
$p, X \subseteq F p, (F \neg p), X \subseteq F \neg p \mid \{p\}; . \mid$ Sub ₄	
$p, \neg p, \dots \qquad p, X G F p, X F \neg p, X G F \neg p \mid \dots \mid (0, \emptyset) \pmod{Ioop}$	

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LTL model checking

Automata-based LTL Model Checking

The standard way to model check a program P against an LTL property φ :

- **1** translate $\neg \varphi$ into a Büchi automaton A
- \boldsymbol{O} check for emptiness the synchronized product of A and P

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LTL model checking

Automata-based LTL Model Checking

The standard way to model check a program *P* against an LTL property φ :

- () translate $\neg \varphi$ into a Büchi automaton A
- \boldsymbol{O} check for emptiness the synchronized product of A and P

Main problem: LTL formulas are often not small!

They describe necessary assumptions of, e.g.:

- fairness
- termination
- allowed request/response pairs

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Example: individual accessibility for semaphores

Thread 1	Thread 2	Thread 3
<pre>while (true) { /1: noncritical; /2: request r; /3: critical; /</pre>	<pre>while (true) { m1: noncritical; m2: request r; m3: critical; m3</pre>	<pre>while (true) { n₁: noncritical; n₂: request r; n₃: critical; r = ritical; r = ritical;</pre>
<pre>/4: release r; }</pre>	<pre>////////////////////////////////////</pre>	<pre>/// // // // // // // // // // // // //</pre>

LTL Properties

Fair scheduling: Termination of critical sections: Individual Accessibility:

$$\begin{array}{l} \varphi_{\mathcal{F}} \equiv \Box \diamondsuit (at_2 \land r_{free}) \implies \Box \diamondsuit at_3 \\ \varphi_{\mathcal{T}} \equiv \Box (at_3 \implies \diamondsuit at_1) \\ \varphi_{\mathcal{A}} \equiv \Box (at_2 \implies \diamondsuit at_3) \end{array}$$

$$\varphi \equiv \bigwedge_{i \in 1..n} (\varphi_{F_i} \land \varphi_{T_i}) \implies \varphi_{A_1}$$

Translation of $\neg \varphi$ into a Büchi automaton: Itl3ba

Threads	Time (sec)	Memory (MB)	Automaton (MB)
2	0.005	4.2	0.002
3	0.09	5.0	0.38
4	9.6	14.7	8.6
5	1295	139	185
6	то	X	Х
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LTL concurrent traces over a theory



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LTL concurrent traces over a theory



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LTL model checking algorithm



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Conclusion



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Conclusion



Thank you for attention!