VERIFIED RUST MONITORS FOR LOLA SPECIFICATIONS

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AN AGE-OLD QUESTION

QUIS CUSTODIET IPSOS CUSTODES?

~ Juvenal (100-200ad)





Cannot be trusted!

MONITOR

observes





Cannot be trusted!

MONITOR

observes

Why trust the monitor?





Cannot be trusted!

Our Goal: Verify the Monitor!

MONITOR

Why trust the monitor?

observes









Lola Specification

Our Goal: Verify the Monitor!

MONITOR

observes









Compilation

Impl	Мс	oni	to)]
whi]	le	le	t	
		=	ge	<u>)</u>
 }				

Lola Specification

Rust Code









Compilation

+ Annotation Generation

Impl Monitor { #[invariant = ...] while let Some(i) $\bullet \bullet \bullet$ }}

Rust Code

Lola Specification

Our Goal: Verify the Monitor!

MONITOR

observes









Code

Our Goal: Verify the Monitor!

MONITOR

0bserves







Our Goal: Verify the Monitor!

MONITOR

01010010

01010110

00110010

00110000

0bserves

= get_input()







input i₁ input i₂ input i₃ output $o_1 := i_3 + 3$ output $o_2 := i_1 + i_2 + o_1$ trigger $o_2 > 7$







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tH_{2,1} tH_{2,2} tH_{2,3} tH_{2,4} tH_{2,5} tH_{2,6} tH_{2,7} tH_{2,8}



input alt

output tooHigh := alt.offset(by: -1, dft: 0) > 500 ^ alt > 500 \wedge alt.offset(by: +1, dft: 0) > 500











input alt

output tooHigh := alt.offset(by: -1, dft: 0) > 500 ^ alt > 500 ^ alt.offset(by: +1, dft: 0) > 500











input alt

output tooHigh := fails @ t=1 alt.offset(by: -1, dft: 0) > 500 ^ alt > 500 ^ alt.offset(by: +1, dft: 0) > 500 fails (a) $t = \sigma$







input alt

output tooHigh := <u>fails @ t=1</u> alt.offset(by: -1, dft: 0) > 500 ^ alt > 500 never fails ^ alt.offset(by: +1, dft: 0) > 500 fails (a) $t = \sigma$





THREE PHASES







= get_input() {

MONITOR LOOP

∧ a₊₁ > 500

fn postfix() {

 $ha_{0} > 500$

a₋₁ > 500

Postfix





= get_input() {

MONITOR LOOP

∧ a₊₁ > 500

fn postfix() {

 $ha_0 > 500$

a₋₁ > 500

Postfix





= get_input() {

MONITOR LOOP

∧ a₊₁ > 500

fn postfix() {

 $ha_{0} > 500$

a₋₁ > 500

Postfix





= get_input() {

MONITOR LOOP

Postfix

fn postfix() {

 $\wedge a_0 > 500$

0 > 500

 $a_1 > 500$

Λ





= get_input() {

Postfix

fn postfix() {

 $h a_0 > 500$

0 > 500

 $a_1 > 500$

Λ



PERFORMANCE BENEFITS



Interpretation 438ns **[CAV'19]**

Compilation

6ns (1.4%)



1.535µs





VERIFICATION

stream \u00e1 infinite sequence of values



RUST



VERIFICATION



VERIFICATION

stream \u00e1 infinite sequence of values



	11	

GHOST MEMORY IN ACTION

#[invariant="forall i: usize :: $(0 \leq i \delta t \leq \mu(a))$ \implies mem.get_a(i) = gm.get_a(iter - i) "] $\#[invariant="new_tooHigh = gm.get_a(iter - 2) > 500 \land ..."]$ while let Some(input) = get_input() { mem.add input(&input); [[EVALUATION LOGIC]] mem.store(new_tooHigh); gm.store(new_tooHigh); if trigger_1 { emit(trigger_1_msg) }





Experiments















































Detected implicit assumption on input stream!









2 T/O (10%) 4 fails (20%)

emory	[MB]
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CONCLUSION



BOTTOM LINE:

- Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? Viper does!
- Successful verification
- Highly performant Code

MORE INFORMATION:

Compiled Code:

Github → Lola2RustArtifact

In Paper:

- Specification Analysis
- Concurrent Implementation



